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INTRODUCTION

The history of American voting rights is marked by two
1
traditions. One expresses a continuing expansion of the formal
right to vote beyond that found when the Constitution was framed,
when only white male property owners of Protestant faith and
2
As former
specific age and citizenship had franchise rights.
Supreme Court Justice Thurgood Marshall aptly put it:
For a sense of the evolving nature of the Constitution we
need look no further than the first three words of the
document’s preamble: “We the People.” When the
Founding Fathers used this phrase in 1787, they did not
have in mind the majority of America’s citizens. “We the
People” included, in the words of the Framers, “the whole
Number of free Persons.” On a matter so basic as the
right to vote, for example, Negro slaves were excluded,
although they were counted for representational purposes
at threefifths [sic] each. Women did not gain the right to
3
vote for over a hundred and thirty years.
According to Marshall, it would take “several amendments, a civil
war, and momentous social transformation” before the right to vote
began even to remotely approximate the promise of “We the
4
people.”
But while one American tradition is marked by an expansion
of franchise, Alexander Keyssar notes another tradition
5
characterized by efforts to deny the right to vote. There were
repeated periods in American history where efforts were made to
disenfranchise voters or to scare them away from the polls. For
example, after the Civil War, many Southerners used Jim Crow
laws, poll taxes, literacy tests, grandfather laws, and not so subtle
means, such as lynchings, cross burnings, and other techniques to
6
prevent newly freed slaves from voting.
1. ALEXANDER KEYSSAR, THE RIGHT TO VOTE: THE CONTESTED HISTORY OF
DEMOCRACY IN THE UNITED STATES xvi–xx (2000).
2. DONALD GRIER STEPHENSON, JR., THE RIGHT TO VOTE: RIGHTS AND LIBERTIES
UNDER THE LAW, 41–65 (2004); KEYSSAR, supra note 1, at xvi.
3. Thurgood Marshall, Remarks at the Annual Seminar of the San Francisco
Patent and Trademark Law Association (May 6, 1987), http://www.nyulaw
global.org/graduateaffairs/documents/Marshall-Bicentennial-Speech.pdf
(citation omitted).
4. Id.
5. KEYSSAR, supra note 1, at xvi–xvii.
6. See generally C. VANN WOODWARD, THE STRANGE CAREER OF JIM CROW (3d
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In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, bans on
fusion tickets, instant runoff voting, proportional voting, and other
so-called reforms were instituted to discourage immigrants and
7
urban poor from voting.
In both cases, the pretext for the
suppression of voting rights was the claim of fraud; the efforts
8
resulted in significant drops in voter turnout. This was America’s
first great disenfranchisement.
A second great disenfranchisement is afoot across the United
States as, yet again, voter fraud is raised as a way to intimidate
immigrants, people of color, the poor, and the powerless, and
9
prevent them from voting. This time the tools are not literacy
tests, poll taxes, or lynch mobs, but rather the use of photo IDs
when voting. Members of the Republican and Democratic parties
have dueled over proposals to make voting requirements more
10
stringent or more relaxed since the 1980s, but the real battle
began in the Florida 2000 and Ohio 2004 presidential contests. It
continues today as allegations of fraud in both of those states have
11
Following the
led to efforts to increase voting requirements.
disputed 2000 presidential election in Florida, Congress enacted
the Help America Vote Act of 2002 (HAVA) as an effort to improve
12
voting, but it came with some picture ID requirements.
According to the Wall Street Journal, at least half of the states have
13
added additional alleged anti-fraud mechanisms since HAVA.
Moreover, several states, including Arizona, Georgia, Indiana,
Michigan, and Missouri, have imposed photo ID requirements to
rev. ed. 1974) (discussing the various techniques used to intimidate AfricanAmericans away from voting).
7. KEYSSAR, supra note 1, at 127–41.
8. STEPHENSON, supra note 2, at 143–54; KEYSSAR, supra note 1, at 159–62.
9. See SPENCER OVERTON, STEALING DEMOCRACY: THE NEW POLITICS OF VOTER
SUPPRESSION 168–69 (2007) (discussing efforts to rig elections in contemporary
America).
10. KEYSSAR, supra note 1, at 314; But see STEVEN E. SCHIER, BY INVITATION
ONLY: THE RISE OF EXCLUSIVE POLITICS IN THE UNITED STATES 1–5, 194–97 (2000)
(arguing that contemporary politics is less characterized by mobilization of voters
than it is by the activation of selected individuals, thereby making neither the
Democrats or Republicans necessarily champions of universal franchise).
11. See ROBERT FITRAKIS ET AL., WHAT HAPPENED IN OHIO: A DOCUMENTARY
RECORD OF THEFT AND FRAUD IN THE 2004 ELECTION (2006) (arguing that the
Secretary of State engaged in numerous attempts to suppress voter turnout before
the 2004 presidential election in that state).
12. 42 U.S.C. § 15301 (2002).
13. Christopher Conkey, Attention, Voters: Have Your ID Ready, WALL ST. J., Oct.
31, 2006, at D1.
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14

vote at the polls. Proponents justify these efforts on the premise
that voter fraud is real and that these measures are needed to
15
control it. As the 2008 presidential and congressional elections
approach, claims of voter fraud and the issue of photo IDs are
heating up. Fraud has become a partisan issue, with Republicans
16
appearing to support voter IDs and Democrats opposing it. In
addition, the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to a
17
photo ID case—Crawford v. Marion County Election Board —setting
the stage for constitutional resolution of the new requirements just
18
in time for the 2008 elections.
A Supreme Court decision
upholding voter ID laws could encourage even more states to adopt
such laws, further enabling the second great disenfranchisement.
This article examines voter fraud and efforts to regulate it
through new photo ID requirements. The overall thesis is that
voter fraud is used as a pretext for a broader agenda to
disenfranchise Americans and rig elections. But the more specific
focus of this article is to examine the evidence of fraud and the
litigation surrounding voter IDs thus far, and to analyze what
supporters of voting rights can learn from both as they move
forward to challenge these laws. The article argues that the
evidence being offered to support photo IDs does not justify the
restrictions being imposed. In addition, the article contends that
the courts have generally reached the wrong conclusions when
adjudicating photo ID claims. Specifically, the article takes aim at
19
the apparent test articulated in Burdick v. Takushi that seems to
justify treating franchise as less than a fundamental right, thereby
permitting the adoption of some regulations that adversely impact
14. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 16.121.01 (2006); GA. CODE. ANN. § 21-2-417 (a)
(Supp. 2007) validity questioned by Common Cause/Ga. League of Women Voters,
Inc. v. Billups, 439 F. Supp. 2d 1294 (N.D. Ga. 2006) (holding that requiring
photo identification at the polling booth was substantially likely to violate the
Equal Protection Clause); IND. CODE. § 3-11-8-25.1 (b) (Supp. 2007); MICH. COMP.
LAWS § 168.523 (1) (Supp. 2007); MO. ANN. STAT. § 115.427 (1) (Supp. 2007).
15. United States Senate Republican Policy Committee, The Need for New Federal
Reforms: Putting An End To Voter Fraud, Feb. 15, 2005, http://rpc.senate.gov/_files/
Feb1504VoterFraudSD.pdf.
16. Adam Liptak, Fear But Few Facts in Debate on Voter IDs, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 24,
2007, at A12.
17. 472 F.3d. 951 (7th Cir. 2007), cert. granted, 76 U.S.L.W. 3122, 3154 (U.S.
Sept. 25, 2007) (No. 07-21).
18. Linda Greenhouse, Justices Agree to Hear Case Challenging Voter ID Laws,
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 26, 2007, at A24.
19. 504 U.S. 428 (1992).
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voting rights. Courts, this article will contend, have generally
misapplied this test. Additionally, as this article puts forth, the test
itself is incoherent and unworkable.
Part I briefly describes the evolution of voting rights in the
United States and reviews the implications of Burdick. Part II
critically examines the literature and evidence on voting fraud.
Part III evaluates litigation surrounding state efforts to enact photo
ID requirements for voting and discusses how courts have ruled
thus far on these new requirements. Finally, Part IV puts forth a
critical analysis of the litigation so far and presents a road map
showing how voting rights supporters can successfully challenge
future attempts to limit voting rights. Overall, the article concludes
that the photo ID laws are unconstitutional, but unless plaintiffs
can provide better arguments in opposing these laws, America will
face the next great wave of voter disenfranchisement.
II. THE RIGHT TO VOTE
20

Bush v. Gore was a controversial landmark decision in which
the Supreme Court halted the ballot recount in the 2000 Florida
presidential election. But in so holding, the Court reminded voters
that the Constitution does not guarantee the right to vote in
21
In fact, while the Court has ruled that
presidential elections.
22
voting is a fundamental right protected under the Constitution, it
has done so in a way that belies the original text of the document.
Nowhere in the United States Constitution is there an explicit
declaration of the right to vote. More specifically, Article II, section
1 grants to the states the authority to determine how they will select
electors who will choose the president. The original Constitution
23
also permitted state legislatures to select the U.S. Senators, while
members of the Supreme Court were to be appointed by the
24
President, subject to confirmation by the Senate. The only public
officials whom the people could select were the members of the
25
House of Representatives, rendering rather thin any notion that
the citizens had broad franchise rights when selecting the national
government.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.

531 U.S. 98 (2000).
Id. at 104 (referencing Article II, section 1 of the Constitution).
Harper v. Virginia State Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966).
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 1.
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 1.
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Initially, the Constitution appears to have left that right up to
the states, which generally limited franchise to white male property
owners who were citizens of a certain age and, occasionally,
26
members of a specific religious faith. For example, in Minor v.
27
Happersett the Supreme Court rejected a claim by a Missouri
woman that as a citizen she had a right to vote under the
Constitution. The Court dismissed her claim, indicating that
citizenship did not necessarily include the right to vote; states could
28
decide who had that right.
After the Civil War, the nation adopted a series of
constitutional amendments that addressed the right to vote. The
Fifteenth Amendment prohibited states from denying the right to
vote on account of “race, color, or previous condition of servitude.”
The Seventeenth Amendment permitted the direct election of
United States Senators. The Nineteenth Amendment enfranchised
women. The Twenty-Fourth Amendment banned poll taxes. The
Twenty-Sixth Amendment directed states to allow qualified citizens
who were age eighteen or older to vote. Yet, none of these
amendments affirmatively granted the right to vote.
It was not until the 1940s that the Supreme Court affirmatively
addressed the constitutional right to vote. In United States v.
29
Classic, a case arising out of voter fraud in a Louisiana federal
election primary, the Court addressed whether one has a right to
30
vote. Secondarily, it addressed whether depriving a person of that
right came within the meaning of a federal criminal law that made
it illegal to “injure and oppress citizens in the free exercise and
enjoyment of rights and privileges secured to them by the
31
Constitution and laws of the United States.” The Court stated:
We come then to the question whether that right is one
secured by the Constitution. Section 2 of Article I
commands that Congressmen shall be chosen by the
people of the several states by electors, the qualifications
of which it prescribes. The right of the people to choose,
whatever its appropriate constitutional limitations, where
in other respects it is defined, and the mode of its exercise
is prescribed by state action in conformity to the
26. KEYSSAR, supra note 1, at 21–25.
27. 88 U.S. 162 (1874).
28. Id. at 177.
29. 313 U.S. 299 (1941).
30. Id. at 307.
31. Id.at 308 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 51 (1940)).
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Constitution, is a right established and guaranteed by the
Constitution and hence is one secured by it to those
citizens and inhabitants of the state entitled to exercise
32
the right.
33
Later, in Reynolds v. Sims, reaffirmed that the Constitution
34
protects the right to vote in federal elections. In so doing, the
Court embraced the principle of equal representation for equal
numbers of people—one person, one vote—for reapportionment
35
purposes.
Furthermore, the Court in Reynolds drew a parallel
between the right to vote and the right to procreate, which was at
36
issue in Skinner v. Oklahoma, declaring the right to vote as
37
fundamental.
Locating constitutional text to support the right to vote in
state elections is more problematic. In Harper v. Virginia State Bd. of
38
Elections, the Supreme Court, in striking down the imposition of a
poll tax in state elections, ruled that the right to vote in state
elections was located in the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process
39
and Equal Protection Clauses. Although the tax met traditional
constitutional standards because it was neither racially
discriminatory nor indefensible as rational policy, the Court still
40
found that it unconstitutionally singled out the poor.
More
importantly, the Court yet again affirmed the importance of voting,
stating that “[l]ong ago in Yick Wo v. Hopkins, the Court referred to
‘the political franchise of voting’ as a ‘fundamental political right,
41
because [it is] preservative of all rights.’” Again, as in Reynolds, the
Court drew a parallel between voting and the right of procreation
found in Skinner, ruling that where “fundamental rights and
liberties are asserted under the Equal Protection Clause,
classifications which might invade or restrain them must be closely
42
scrutinized and carefully confined.” Specifically, the Court cited

32. Id. at 314.
33. 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
34. Id. at 554.
35. Id. at 558.
36. 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
37. Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 561.
38. 383 U.S. 663 (1966).
39. Id. at 665.
40. Id. at 666-67.
41. Id. at 667 (quoting 118 U.S. 356, 370 (1886)).
42. Id. at 670.
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to language in Skinner dictating that efforts to interfere with the
43
right to procreation must be subject to strict scrutiny.
The legacy of Classic, Reynolds, and Harper is judicial
recognition of voting as a fundamental right, subject to strict
scrutiny. In addition to these three cases, the Court reached
44
Collectively, these cases suggest
similar conclusions elsewhere.
that interference with or regulation of the fundamental right to
vote must be subject to strict scrutiny and that the right may only be
45
limited if a compelling government interest overrides it.
Unfortunately, the Court created some confusion on this point in
46
Burdick v. Takushi.
In Burdick, the issue was a Hawaii state law prohibiting write-in
47
In rejecting the First and Fourteenth Amendment
voting.
48
challenges to the law, the Supreme Court described its approach
to voting rights regulations:
It is beyond cavil that “voting is of the most fundamental
significance under our constitutional structure.” It does
not follow, however, that the right to vote in any manner
and the right to associate for political purposes through
the ballot are absolute. The Constitution provides that
States may prescribe “[t]he Times, Places and Manner of
holding Elections for Senators and Representatives,” Art.
43. Id. (citing Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942)).
44. See e.g., Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 104 (2000); Ill. Bd. of Elections v.
Socialist Workers Party, 440 U.S. 173 (1979); Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724, 756
(1974) (“[W]hen legislation burdens such a fundamental constitutional right, it is
not enough that the legislative means rationally promote legitimate governmental
ends. Rather, ‘governmental action may withstand constitutional scrutiny only
upon a clear showing that the burden imposed is necessary to protect a
compelling and substantial governmental interest.’” (citations omitted)); Rosario
v. Rockefeller, 410 U.S. 752, 767–68 (1973); Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 336
(1972); Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 142 (1970); Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S.
23, 38 (1968) (declaring “[w]hen ‘fundamental rights and liberties' are at issue, a
State has less leeway in making classifications than when it deals with economic
matters.” (citations omitted)); Cardona v. Power, 384 U.S. 672, 676 (1966) (ruling
that “[w]here classifications might ‘invade or restrain’ fundamental rights and
liberties, they must be ‘closely scrutinized and carefully confined.’”(citations
omitted)).
45. See generally Stephen E. Gottlieb, Compelling Governmental Interests: An
Essential But Unanalyzed Term in Constitutional Adjudication, 68 B.U.L. REV. 917
(1988) (presenting a general discussion of the interplay between fundamental
rights and compelling governmental interests).
46. 504 U.S. 428 (1992).
47. Id. at 430.
48. Id. at 430–31.
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I, § 4, cl. 1, and the Court therefore has recognized that
49
States retain the power to regulate their own elections.
According to the Court, states or the government must
50
structure elections to promote fairness and honesty. Thus, not all
regulations need to be subject to strict scrutiny simply because they
impose some burdens on voters.
Election laws will invariably impose some burden upon
individual voters. Each provision of a code, “whether it
governs the registration and qualifications of voters, the
selection and eligibility of candidates, or the voting
process itself, inevitably affects—at least to some degree—
the individual’s right to vote and his right to associate with
others for political ends.” Consequently, to subject every
voting regulation to strict scrutiny and to require that the
regulation be narrowly tailored to advance a compelling
state interest, as petitioner suggests, would tie the hands
of States seeking to assure that elections are operated
equitably and efficiently. Accordingly, the mere fact that
a State’s system “creates barriers . . . tending to limit the
field of candidates from which voters might choose . . .
51
does not of itself compel close scrutiny.”
Apparently replacing the strict scrutiny standard previously
used to examine the right to vote, the Court proposed a different
test to be used:
A court considering a challenge to a state election law
must weigh “the character and magnitude of the asserted
injury to the rights protected by the First and Fourteenth
Amendments that the plaintiff seeks to vindicate” against
“the precise interests put forward by the State as
justifications for the burden imposed by its rule,” taking
into consideration “the extent to which those interests
52
make it necessary to burden the plaintiff’s rights.”
Thus, in examining Hawaii’s ban on write-in voting, the Court used
53
this new flexible standard to uphold it.
The Burdick decision is confusing. While it perhaps looks as if
the Court ruled that all regulations affecting voting need to be
49. Id. at 433 (citing Ill. Bd. of Elections, 440 U.S. at 184; Munro v. Socialist
Workers Party, 479 U.S. 189, 193 (1986)).
50. Id.
51. Id. (quoting Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 788 (1983); Bullock v.
Carter, 405 U.S. 134, 143 (1972)).
52. Id. at 434 (quoting Anderson, 460 U.S. at 789).
53. Id.
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examined from this new flexible and less rigorous standard, the
language citations suggest otherwise. First, in referencing the cases
where the Court held that the right to vote is not absolute, it cited
not to cases about voting rights per se, but to cases involving ballot
54
These references
access and the rights of political parties.
question the degree to which the Court diluted its previous strict
scrutiny test. Second, and more importantly, the Court sowed
seeds of doubt by distinguishing between two different types of
voting regulations—those which impose “severe” versus
55
“reasonable” burdens. Regulations imposing the former types of
burdens would continue to be examined under the strict scrutiny
standard under which they must be “narrowly drawn to advance a
56
state interest of compelling importance.” But for the latter, the
new standard would be used “when a state election law provision
imposes only ‘reasonable, nondiscriminatory restrictions’ upon the
First and Fourteenth Amendment rights of voters, as ‘the State’s
important regulatory interests are generally sufficient to justify’ the
57
restrictions.”
Unfortunately, the Court failed to describe what
constituted a severe burden versus a reasonable one, creating
confusion about which standard applies to which regulation. This
confusion set the stage for later disputes over efforts to enact voter
ID laws.
III. THE SPECTER OF VOTER FRAUD
A. The Legacy of Florida 2000
Allegations of voter fraud and election rigging go back to the
earliest days of American history. George Washington was accused
58
Efforts to tighten restrictions on
of using rum to buy votes.
African-American franchise rights after the Civil War and upon
urban, immigrant, and poor voters during the Populist and
59
Progressive eras were ostensibly to combat election fraud, even
though, as Keyssar notes, there was little hard evidence to support

54. See id. at 432–33.
55. Id. at 434.
56. Id. (quoting Norman v. Reed, 502 U.S. 279, 289 (1992)).
57. Id.
58. MELVIN I. UROFSKY, MONEY & FREE SPEECH: CAMPAIGN FINANCE REFORM AND
THE COURTS 4-5 (2005).
59. Keyssar, supra note 1, at 159.
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the rumors and allegations that this type of corruption was
60
systematic.
The most recent efforts to restrict or regulate voting rights in
the name of combating fraud grew out of the disputed Florida 2000
presidential election. The 2000 presidential race between George
W. Bush and Al Gore was close, with the allocation of Florida’s
electoral votes determining who became president. The popular
61
vote in Florida gave Bush a lead of less than 1800 votes, but
concern soon surfaced on many fronts about the fairness and
62
accuracy of the voting procedures and counting.
Kathryn Harris, the Florida Secretary of State and state chair of
the Bush election committee, was embroiled in the middle of major
controversies that alleged pre-election voter purges directed at
African-Americans, the random opening and closing of polls, the
intimidation of minority voters, the use of faulty and different
voting technologies across the state, bad ballot designs, and
outright allegations of ineligible voters falsely identifying
63
themselves in order to vote. While Bush v. Gore only addressed the
64
issues of vote counting arising under the Equal Protection clause,
65
rumors arising out of the election persisted, fueling allegations
stemming back to the 1990s purporting that passage of the Motor
Voter Act, which permitted mail-in and same-day voter registration,
66
would enable voter fraud. Again, after the close 2004 presidential
race between John Kerry and George W. Bush, similar allegations
67
of both voter intimidation and fraud arose in Ohio.

60.
61.

See id.
ABNER GREENE, UNDERSTANDING THE 2000 ELECTION: A GUIDE TO THE
LEGAL BATTLES THAT DECIDED THE PRESIDENCY 43 (2001).
62. Id. at 44–49.
63. GERALD M. POMPER, THE ELECTION OF 2000 127–28 (2001); Greene, supra
note 61, at 42–45. See generally VINCENT BUGLIOSI, THE BETRAYAL OF AMERICA: HOW
THE SUPREME COURT UNDERMINDED THE CONSTITUTION AND CHOSE OUR PRESIDENT
(2001); ALAN M. DERSHOWITZ, SUPREME INJUSTICE: HOW THE HIGH COURT HIJACKED
ELECTION 2000 (2001) (detailing the litany of allegations about the rigging of the
Florida 2000 election).
64. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 108–110 (2000).
65. See David Schultz, Election 2000: The Bush v. Gore Scholarship, 4 PUB.
INTEGRITY 360 (2002) (reviewing ten books that examined allegations of voter
fraud and irregularities surrounding Bush v. Gore and the Florida 2000
presidential election results).
66. Keyssar, supra note 1, at 314.
67. See generally STEVE FREEMAN & JOEL BLEIFUSS, WAS THE 2004 PRESIDENTIAL
ELECTION STOLEN?: EXIT POLLS, ELECTION FRAUD, AND THE OFFICIAL COUNT (2006);
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B. Documenting Voter Fraud
Is there widespread voter fraud in the United States that is
affecting elections? The answer is not easy, given that there are no
comprehensive peer-reviewed studies examining voting fraud in
68
the United States. For the most part, most of the stories about
fraud are just that—stories and anecdotal tidbits of information not
well corroborated or systematically studied. On top of that, the
69
term “voter fraud” is vague.
Lorraine Minnite seeks to define
voter fraud by drawing upon a broader Department of Justice
definition: election fraud is “conduct that corrupts the process by
which ballots are obtained, marked, or tabulated; the process by
which election results are canvassed and certified; or the process by
70
which voter are registered.”
Minnite locates voter fraud as a subcategory of this broader
concept of election fraud, defining it as the “intentional corruption
71
of the electoral process by voters.” She wishes to distinguish this
form of fraud from that which takes place at the hands of election
officials, parties, candidates, and others who are involved in
72
This article
election administration and political campaigns.
employs Minnite’s definition of voter fraud. But it is important to
note that besides voter fraud, this article also refers to other forms
of election fraud as “election official fraud.” The latter includes
situations in which election officials or parties other than voters
falsely register or permit ineligible individuals to vote, engage in
vote buying or swapping, or engage in other forms of vote
73
suppression or manufacturing.

FITRAKIS, supra note 11 (discussing allegations of voter fraud in 2004 presidential
election).
68. U.S. ELECTIONS ASSISTANCE COMMISSION, ELECTION CRIMES: AN INITIAL
REVIEW AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE STUDY 20 (2006), available at
http://www.eac.gov/clearinghouse/docs/reportsandsurveys2006electioncrimes.
pdf/attachment_download/file.
69. LORRAINE C. MINNITE, THE POLITICS OF VOTER FRAUD 6 (2007), available at
http://projectvote.org/fileadmin/ProjectVote/Publications/Politics_of_Voter_Fr
aud_Final.pdf.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. See SPENCER OVERTON, STEALING DEMOCRACY: THE NEW POLITICS OF VOTER
SUPPRESSION (2007). See generally DENNIS F. THOMPSON, JUST ELECTIONS: CREATING A
FAIR ELECTORAL PROCESS IN THE UNITED STATES (2002) (presenting discussions of
vote suppression and manufacturing techniques).
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Even within the category of voter fraud it is important to
realize that a host of activities can be included under this term.
Voter fraud could include intentional efforts to register falsely to
vote or actually to vote falsely. Allegations of voter fraud include
claims that illegal immigrants, ex-felons, and impersonators are
stealing the identities of others, including the dead, in order to
74
vote illegally. Voter fraud could also take place in several venues,
like the election-day polls, in completing absentee ballots, or in
completing the paperwork necessary to register to vote. Given
these distinctions, the evidence is clear: there is little systematic or
widespread voter fraud in the United States that is changing the
outcome of elections. This is at least true among the types of fraud
that voter ID laws are meant to address.
The three most persistent claims of voter fraud come from the
Wall Street Journal’s John Fund, a report from the Senate Republican
Policy Committee in Congress, and the Carter-Baker Report.
75
Fund’s Stealing Elections calls for mandatory photo identification to
be displayed when voting to counteract widespread fraud occurring
in the United States. Yet what evidence is there that voter fraud is
rampant? Fund offers little. Stealing Elections draws upon interviews
around the country to whip up hysteria that droves of dead people,
illegal immigrants, vote brokers, and ex-felons are cheating their
way into voting booths, stealing elections from honest decent
Republicans, and diluting the votes of red, white, and blue
Americans. But when the smoke from Fund’s allegations clears,
there is little voter fraud fire, at least of the kind he alleges.
For example, Fund alleges that the Florida 2000 presidential
election demonstrated “sloppiness that makes fraud and foul-ups in
76
Even if one accepts all of his
election counts possible . . . .”
comments as true, the sloppiness he alleges is not voter fraud; the
problems are with election officials. Fund also alleges that “lax
standards for registration encouraged by the Motor Voter Act have
77
left the voter rolls in a shambles in many states.” Again, this mere
allegation does not document which states, define what shambles
means, or describe how the problems affect voting or whether
74. See Craig C. Donsanto, Prosecution of Electoral Fraud Under States Federal
Law, 1558 PLI/CORP 655 (2006).
75. JOHN FUND, STEALING ELECTIONS: HOW VOTER FRAUD THREATENS OUR
DEMOCRACY (2004).
76. Id. at 3–4.
77. Id. at 25.
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those problems constitute voter fraud. Stealing Elections is rife with
these types of unsubstantiated allegations of election fraud, let
alone voter fraud, that Fund claims have actually risen to a level
that affects elections. Fund seems only to offer anecdotal evidence
that election officials have erred in letting some individuals register
when they should not have or that a few persons have tried to vote
twice in the same election, such as showing up to the polls to vote
after forgetting they voted by absentee ballot. Fund, in a recent op78
ed, seems not to have learned the errors of his ways. In that Wall
Street Journal essay he referenced a felon named Ben Miller in
Florida who voted illegally for the last sixteen years, and mentioned
that in the Florida 2000 election there were 5643 voters’ names that
79
But what
“perfectly matched the names of convicted felons.”
Fund does not say or apparently seek to investigate or prove is
whether Ben Miller knew he was ineligible to vote or whether
election officials incorrectly registered him. And of the 5643
names, Fund fails to show that these individuals were barred from
voting or that they were doing anything wrong. Ex-felons, after all,
are not barred from voting in all states and in all circumstances as
80
Fund’s insinuations would imply.
For the most part, Fund’s
allegations are based upon rumor, half-truths, and innuendos that
fail the test of any valid social science study.
A second report by the Senate Republican Policy Committee,
81
entitled Putting an End to Voter Fraud, asserts that “[v]oter fraud
82
continues to plague our nation’s federal elections . . . .” The basis
of its allegations rests in assertions that the National Voter
83
Registration Act of 1993 has made it difficult to maintain accurate
84
lists to keep people from voting illegally, that non-citizens are
85
voting illegally, and that there may be risks associated with early
86
and absentee voting. Again, little evidence of voter fraud, either
of a substantive or systematic nature, is offered. For example, the
78. See John Fund, Editorial, Vote-Fraud Demagogues, WALL ST. J., June 13, 2007,
at A19.
79. Id.
80. 25 AM. JUR. 2D Elections § 174 (2007).
81. UNITED STATES SENATE REPUBLICAN POLICY COMMITTEE, PUTTING AN END TO
VOTER FRAUD (2005), http://rpc.senate.gov/_files/Feb1504VoterFraudSD.pdf.
82. Id. at 1.
83. National Voter Registration Act (Motor Voter Act) of 1993, 42 U.S.C.
§ 1973gg-gg-10 (2000 & Supp. 2007).
84. UNITED STATES SENATE REPUBLICAN POLICY COMMITTEE, supra note 81, at 5.
85. Id. at 7.
86. Id. at 8.
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report cites allegations of illegal voting in the 2004 Wisconsin
87
presidential elections but provides no firm numbers to show if the
allegations are true or significant. In terms of the threat of noncitizens voting, the report mainly references efforts in many
88
jurisdictions to change the law to allow non-citizens to vote legally.
Those who argue that there is widespread voter fraud
requiring new measures such as voter IDs often cite a third report
entitled Building Confidence in U.S. Elections: Report of the Commission
89
on Federal Election Reform, which was chaired by former president
Jimmy Carter and former Secretary of State James Baker (“Carter90
The report asserts that “while election
Baker Commission”).
91
fraud is difficult to measure, it occurs.” Proof of this assertion is
citation to 180 Department of Justice investigations resulting in
convictions of fifty-two individuals from October 2002 until the
92
Yet while the Carter-Baker Commission
release of the report.
called for voter photo IDs, it also noted that “there is no evidence
of extensive fraud in U.S. elections, or of multiple voting, but both
93
occur, and it could affect the outcome of a close election.” As
with other studies, absentee voting is singled out as the place where
fraud is most likely to occur, followed by registration drives by third
94
parties.
Empirical evidence supporting the Carter-Baker Commission
findings of fraud is scant at best. As noted, the report concludes
that fraud is not extensive, but when the report cites to support its
claims, it references newspaper articles and other accounts that are
95
not corroborated or subject to critical analysis. As the Brennan
Center stated in its analysis and response to the Carter-Baker call
for a voter photo ID: “[T]he Report attempts to support its
burdensome identification requirements on four specific examples
of purported fraud or potential fraud. None of the Report’s cited
87.
88.
89.

Id. at 7.
Id.
CENTER FOR DEMOCRACY AND ELECTION MANAGEMENT, AMERICAN
UNIVERSITY, BUILDING CONFIDENCE IN U.S. ELECTIONS: REPORT OF THE COMMISSION
ON FEDERAL ELECTION REFORM (2005) [hereinafter Carter-Baker Commission],
http://www.american.edu/ia/cfer/report/full_report.pdf.
90. Id. at 18 (calling for voter IDs when voting).
91. Id. at 45.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 46.
95. See Carter-Baker Commission, supra note 89, at 18, 73 n.19 (citing to
Section 1.1 of the report).
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96

examples of fraud stand up under closer scrutiny.” Even if all of
the documented accounts of fraud were true, the Brennan Center
points out that in the state of Washington, for example, six cases of
double voting and nineteen instances of individuals voting in the
name of the dead yielded twenty-five fraudulent votes out of
97
2,812,675 cast—a 0.0009% rate of fraud. Also, assume the fiftytwo convictions by the Department of Justice are accurate instances
of fraud. This means that fifty-two out of 196,139,871 ballots cast in
98
federal elections, or .00003% of the votes were fraudulent. While
critics might assert that these cases represent only the tip of the
iceberg, it is important to underscore that prosecutions occurred
on the heels of the Justice Department taking an aggressive stance
99
There is a greater chance of one being hit by
on this crime.
100
lightning than of an election being affected by fraud.
While studies seeking to prove voter fraud offer a paucity of
evidence, studies reaching the opposite conclusion are more
plentiful. The United States Elections Assistance Commission
(“EAC”) undertook a broad review of literature and expert
interviews on what was then known about voter fraud when the
EAC was operating, creating the report Election Crimes: An Initial
101
It concluded that
Review and Recommendations for Future Study.
“[m]any of the allegations made in the reports and books . . . were
not substantiated[,]” even though they were often cited by many
102
The report held that the same was
parties as evidence of fraud.
103
and that even stories about
true regarding media accounts
104
prosecutions lacked reliable follow up. Overall, the report noted
that while “impersonation of voters is probably the least frequent
type of fraud because it is the most likely type of fraud to be
discovered, there are stiff penalties associated with this type of
105
fraud, and it is an inefficient method of influencing an election.”
Instead of impersonation, absentee ballot voting was described as
96.

WENDY WEISER

ET AL.,

ON FEDERAL ELECTION REFORM

RESPONSE TO THE REPORT OF
9 (2005) (emphasis omitted).

THE

2005 COMMISSION

97. Id.
98. Id. at 10.
99. Eric Lipton & Ian Urbina, In 5-Year Effort, Scant Evidence of Voter Fraud, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 12, 2007, at A1, available at 2007 WLNR 6949847.
100. WEISER, supra note 96, at 10.
101. U.S. ELECTION ASSISTANCE COMMISSION, supra note 68, at 2–3.
102. Id. at 16.
103. See id.
104. See id. at 16–19.
105. Id. at 9.
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106

most susceptible to voter fraud, but, even with it, the EAC called
107
for more statistical analysis to determine its seriousness.
But even as this version of the EAC report downplayed voter
fraud while calling for more study of the subject, the original draft
was more conclusive in dismissing allegations. According to the
New York Times, “a federal panel, the Election Assistance
Commission, reported last year that the pervasiveness of fraud was
debatable. That conclusion played down findings of the consultants
who said there was little evidence of it across the country, according
108
As reported in the New York
to a review of the original report.”
Times, experts hired by the EAC to consult with them largely found
that mistakes and errors by election officials—as well honest
109
mistakes by voters—have caused some problems.
Yet overall,
according to Richard G. Frohling, assistant United States attorney
in Milwaukee, “[t]here was nothing that we uncovered that
110
suggested some sort of concerted effort to tilt the election . . . .”
In effect, while the final version of the EAC report seemed tentative
in dismissing fraud as a phenomenon, the experts and perhaps
even the original version of the report were even more conclusive
on this point.
Lorraine Minnite has conducted several studies on the extent
111
of voter fraud in the United States.
One of those studies cites
statistics provided by the Department of Justice, indicating that
between 2002 and 2005, when the Attorney General made election
fraud and corruption a priority, only twenty-six individuals were
convicted or pled guilty to illegal voting. The twenty-six individuals
included five who could not vote because of felony convictions,
fourteen non-citizens, and five who voted twice in the same
112
During that same time period, another fourteen
election.
individuals were prosecuted but not convicted by the Justice
113
Department.
Minnite has also noted how states have heavily
106. Id.
107. Id. at 18–19.
108. Lipton & Urbina, supra note 99.
109. See id.
110. Id.
111. MINNITE, supra note 69.
112. LORRAINE C. MINNITE, AN ANALYSIS OF VOTER FRAUD IN THE U.S. 11 (2007),
http://www.demos.org/pubs/analysis_voter_fraud.pdf. This is a later version of
the original Minnite study that reached the same conclusions. References in this
article are to the original study.
113. Id.
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114

criminalized voter fraud, and local law enforcement officials do
not seem to be shying away from election fraud issues as a result of
115
a lack of desire, ability, or resources to combat fraud. Moreover,
when Minnite examined the often told allegations of illegal voting
or registration in Wisconsin during the 2004 presidential race, she
found that either the individuals did not know they voted illegally,
that the stories were later recanted, or that prosecutions (a total of
116
Minnite
three) were dropped due to a lack of evidence.
concluded that voter fraud allegations are really partisan
117
Republican efforts to suppress voting.
Other studies have reached similar conclusions about the lack
of voter fraud. While some, such as the Republican Senate Policy
Committee, express concern that the Motor Voter Act is a potential
source of voter fraud, an EAC report on the law’s impact did not
118
discuss fraud.
In the report, voter fraud is not discussed in the
119
section on voter verification. In fact, the report seems to suggest
that states have this issue under control. The problem getting the
120
most attention is removal from voter rolls for non-voting.
An
Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights report found
121
only isolated reports of voter fraud or impersonation. Additional
analysis on the impact of the Motor Voter Act by Jonathan E.
122
123
Davis, the Carter-Baker report, and a Rutgers University study
of the impact of provisional voting procedures as outlined in the

114.
115.
116.
117.
118.

Id. at 9.
Id.
MINNITE, supra note 69, at 32–35.
Id. at 36.
U.S. ELECTIONS ASSISTANCE COMMISSION, THE IMPACT OF THE NATIONAL
VOTER REGISTRATION ACT OF 1993 ON THE ADMINISTRATION OF ELECTIONS FOR
FEDERAL OFFICE 2005–2006: A REPORT TO THE 110TH CONGRESS (June 30, 2007),
available at http://projectvote.org/fileadmin/ProjectVote/Publications/EAC_NV
RArpt2006.pdf.
119. Id. at 12.
120. Id. at 11.
121. OFFICE FOR DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS AND HUMAN RIGHTS , UNITED STATES
OF
AMERICA MID-TERM CONGRESSIONAL ELECTIONS 7 NOVEMBER 2006:
OSCE/ODIHR ELECTION ASSESSMENT MISSION REPORT 16 (Mar. 9, 2007), available
at http://www.osce.org/documents/odihr/2007/03/23567_en.pdf.
122. Jonathan E. Davis, The National Voter Registration Act of 1993: Debunking
States' Rights Resistance and the Pretense of Voter Fraud, 6 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV.
117, 135–37 (1997).
123. Spencer Overton, Voter Identification, 105 MICH. L. REV. 631, 648 (2007).
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124

Help America Vote Act of 2002 also found little if any evidence of
fraud in American elections.
Overall, despite some episodic and sporadic accounts, the best
available evidence shows that voter fraud is a minor issue in
American elections. There is little hard evidence that it occurs,
even less evidence that it is widespread, and almost no indication
that it has altered election outcomes.
C. Assessing the Impact of New Voting Requirements
In addition to a lack of evidence about voting fraud, one can
also assess the impact of new election procedures by examining
how they affect decisions to vote.
Political scientists have long noted how decisions to register
and vote are affected by numerous variables, including income,
125
Social capital and trust may also have an
age, and generation.
126
impact. In general, the more barriers placed in front of potential
voters, such as decreased time allotments to register to vote, the less
127
likely they are to vote. The same is true with voter ID laws. They
impose a cost on citizens that may make it less likely that they will
vote. At least three studies discussed below substantiate this claim.
First, Timothy Vercellotti and David Anderson examined the
likely impact of voter ID laws across the United States. They found
that photo ID laws would reduce the probability of voting by 3.7%

124. See generally EAGLETON INSTITUTE OF POLITICS CENTER FOR PUBLIC INTEREST
POLLING, APPENDIX A: NATIONAL SURVEY OF LOCAL ELECTION OFFICIALS’ EXPERIENCES
WITH PROVISIONAL VOTING (July-Aug. 2005), available at http://www.eagleton.
rutgers.edu/NewsResearch/AppendA_National_Survey_Local_Election_Officials.
pdf (surveying elections officials’ experiences with provisional voting).
125. See, e.g., WARREN E. MILLER & J. MERRILL SHANKS, THE NEW AMERICAN
VOTER 88-90, 111 (1996) (discussing the New Deal and Post-New Deal
generations). See generally PAUL R. ABRAMSON, JOHN H. ALDRICH, & DAVID W.
ROHDE, CHANGE AND CONTINUITY IN THE 2000 AND 2002 ELECTIONS (2003)
(discussing voting behavior in the 2000 Presidential election); M. MARGARET
CONWAY, POLITICAL PARTICIPATION IN THE UNITED STATES (1985) (discussing social
and political characteristics of voting patterns); Expert Report and Affidavit of
Marjorie R. Hershey, Ind. Democratic Party v. Rokita, 2005 WL 4019117 (S.D. Ind.
October 25, 2005) (providing a bibliography documenting this proposition).
126. ROBERT D. PUTNAM, BOWLING ALONE: THE COLLAPSE AND REVIVAL OF
AMERICAN COMMUNITY 404–14 (2000).
127. RAYMOND E. WOLFINGER & STEVEN J. ROSENSTONE, WHO VOTES? 61–62
(1980).
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for whites, 6% for African-Americans, and nearly 10% for Hispanic128
Americans.
Second, a study by the Brennan Center for Justice found that
7% of the population lacked ready access to the citizenship type
papers, such as passports and birth certificates that are necessary to
vote, that 11% of the population does not have a governmentissued ID, and that low-income individuals are less likely to have the
129
The Brennan Center study
requisite identification to vote.
indicates that the requirements, time, and money to secure a valid
photo ID for voting imposed costs on certain populations that
would discourage voting.
130
Finally, Professor Marjorie Hershey prepared testimony as an
expert witness for the plaintiffs in Indiana Democratic Party v.
131
Rokita assessing the likely impact of a state’s new photo ID law on
132
voter turnout. In developing her analysis, Hershey indicated that
perhaps the dominant mode political scientists use to assess voting
laws is a rational choice or economic model, which asks what costs
are imposed by new procedures upon individuals deciding whether
133
or not to vote. According to Hershey, “people are likely to vote as
long as the perceived costs of voting do not outweigh the perceived
134
benefits.”
“Costs of voting” include time to register to vote,
waiting times, financial and informational costs, registration laws,
135
Hershey provides in her affidavit ample
and physical barriers.
empirical evidence from political scientists to demonstrate that as
136
the costs of voting increase, registration and turnout decrease.
Overall, her argument is that photo ID requirements for voting are
128. Timothy Vercellotti & David Anderson, Protecting the Franchise or Restricting
it? The Effect of Voter Identification Requirements on Turnout 13 (Aug. 31–Sept. 3,
2006), available at http://www.brennancenter.org/dynamic/subpages/download_
file_50903.pdf.
129. Brennan Center for Justice, Citizens Without Proof: A Survey of Americans’
Possession of Documentary Proof of Citizenship and Photo Identification 2–3 (Nov. 2006),
http://www.brennancenter.org/dynamic/subpages/download_file_39242.pdf.
130. Hershey aff., supra note 125.
131. 458 F. Supp. 2d 775 (S.D. Ind. 2006).
132. Hershey aff., supra note 125, at *1.
133. Id. at *3.
134. Id.
135. Id. at *3–4.
136. Id. at *6–8. For example, Hershey references studies showing how
improvements in transportation in the nineteenth century had a dramatic increase
in voter turnout. Id. at *6. Also, she notes how political scientists have concluded
that "[r]egistration raises the costs of voting.” Id. at *7.
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137

138

a definite cost, especially for some groups such as the poor,
139
those without government-issued IDs, and people of color.
Taken together, these three studies, along with other political
and social science literature, demonstrate that new voting
requirements, such as photo IDs, impose costs on citizens deciding
to go to the polls. These costs are likely to impact voting negatively.
Combine these studies with those that examine voter fraud in the
United States and the conclusion becomes obvious: voter ID laws
are not neutral. Not only is there negligible (at best) evidence of
voter fraud to support the necessity of voter ID laws, but these laws
are also negative because they might actually suppress real voter
turnout by imposing additional burdens on voters.
IV. STATE PHOTO ID LITIGATION
Evidence and potential impact notwithstanding, several states
have recently enacted photo ID laws for voting. In cases arising out
140
141
142
143
of Indiana,
Michigan, Georgia, and Arizona, courts have
144
upheld the photo ID voting laws, while similar laws in Missouri
145
and in New Mexico have been struck down. Critical to the
decisions in these cases was the attitude of the courts towards both
the standard of review required to evaluate the ID law and the level
of deference and recognition given to the purported evidence of
voter fraud.
A. Indiana and Crawford v. Marion County Election Board
146

At issue in Crawford v. Marion County Election Board was an
Indiana law mandating that “persons wanting to vote in person in
either a primary or a general election must present at the polling

137. Id. at *4.
138. Id. at *6.
139. Id.
140. Crawford v. Marion County Election Bd., 472 F.3d 949 (7th Cir. 2007).
141. In re Request for Advisory Opinion Regarding Constitutionality of 2005
PA 71, 479 Mich. 1 (2007).
142. Common Cause/Georgia v. Billups, 504 F. Supp. 2d 1333 (N.D.Ga. 2007).
143. Gonzalez v. Arizona, 485 F.3d 1041 (9th Cir. 2007).
144. Weinschenk v. State, 203 S.W.3d 201 (Mo. 2006).
145. Women Voters of Albuquerque/Bernalillo County, Inc. v. Santillanes, 506
F.Supp.2d 598 (D.N.M. 2007).
146. 472 F.3d 929, 950 (7th Cir. 2007).
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147

place a government-issued photo ID,” unless voting in a nursing
148
home or by absentee ballot. Both the district court and the
Seventh Circuit upheld the ID requirement.
The challenge in Indiana Democratic Party v. Rokita was to the
149
Senate Enrollment Act No. 483 (“SEA”) requiring voters to
150
present a photo ID at the polls when voting.
According to SEA,
the identification was required to have:
(1) A photograph of the individual to whom the “proof
of identification” was issued; (2) The name of the
individual to whom the document was issued, which
“conforms to the name in the individual’s voter
registration record”; (3) An expiration date; (4) The
identification must be current or have expired after the
date of the most recent general election; and (5) The
“proof of identification” must have been “issued by the
151
United States or the state of Indiana.”
The law was challenged as a facial violation of the First and
Fourteenth Amendments, as well as a violation of various provisions
152
Voters lacking an acceptable ID
of the Indiana Constitution.
would be subject to challenge by a member of a precinct election
board but would have been allowed to file a provisional ballot and
given an opportunity to prove eligibility and to have the ballot
accepted if an acceptable photo was later produced before the
153
clerk or the election board. The court recited a list of documents
that would be considered acceptable and sufficient under state law
154
to obtain the state-issued photo ID. In addition to the documents
necessary to obtain the state-issued ID, there was a minimum $10
155
fee that had to be paid.
In order to justify the photo ID requirement the state
156
But the state
contended that it needed to address voter fraud.
conceded that it “is not aware of any incidents or person
attempting to vote, or voting, at a voting place with fraudulent or
147.
2007)).
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.

Id. (citing IND. CODE ANN. §§ 3-5-2-40.5, 3-10-1-7.2, 3-11-8-25.1 (West
Ind. Democratic Party v. Rokita, 458 F. Supp. 2d 775 (S.D. Ind. 2006).
IND. CODE § 3-5-2-40.5 (2007).
Rokita, 458 F. Supp. 2d at 782.
Id. at 786 (citing IND. CODE ANN. § 3-5-2-40.5).
Id. at 782.
Id. at 786–87.
Id. at 789–91.
Id. at 792.
Id. at 792–93.
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157

otherwise false identification.”
But, as the district court noted,
the defendants in the case justified the voter ID requirement by
stating:
[E]ven though there is no evidence of voter fraud as such,
there is significant inflation in the Indiana voter
registration lists; and in any event, based on reports
documenting cases of in-person voter [fraud] from other
states . . . [d]efendants maintain that voter fraud is or
158
should be a concern in Indiana.
In terms of the inflated voter lists, the court noted, among
other things, that “there were 4.3 million registered voters in 2004,
while there were only 3 million residents who reported being
159
The court
registered, resulting in estimated inflation of 41.4%.”
also pointed out that 35,699 of the Indiana registered voters are
160
now deceased.
Second, the state offered evidence of voter fraud
in other jurisdictions, citing, among other sources, John Fund’s
Stealing Elections and other instances of purported election
161
corruption.
The state and the court noted what appears to be a
corrosive impact upon voter confidence in elections if fraud occurs,
using among other sources both Stealing Elections and the CarterBaker Report, as well as public opinion surveys to support the
162
Finally, in addition to searching for
photo ID requirement.
evidence of fraud, the court also assessed the evidence offered by
the plaintiffs to demonstrate that costs and impact that SEA would
163
This evidence included the Hershey report and
have on voters.
164
other surveys by groups in Indiana, and another expert study,
called the Brace Report, which documented a potential 989,000
165
voters in the state that did not have the required state-issued ID.
The court largely ignored the Hershey report and rejected
introduction of the Brace Report as unreliable under the Federal
166
Rules of Evidence.
157. Id.
158. Id. at 792.
159. Id. at 793.
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. Id. at 794. Specifically, the surveys are used to show that large majorities
of those polled support the presentation of photo IDs when voting. Id.
163. Id. at 794–96.
164. Id.
165. Id. at 803.
166. Id.
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In terms of the substantive legal analysis challenging SEA,
the court began by noting that the right to vote is fundamental, but
then it shifted to Burdick in declaring that it is not an absolute
168
right.
The court again referenced Burdick in noting that not all
regulations of the right to vote impose the same burdens; those
169
imposing lesser burdens deserve lesser scrutiny.
The court,
following Burdick, rejected the application of strict scrutiny to SEA
because not every voting regulation required that level of analysis,
170
In
even if it resulted in denying some people the right to vote.
addition, the court rejected the notion that the photo ID
requirement is a severe burden under Burdick (therefore triggering
strict scrutiny) because the plaintiffs, while showing a burden in
171
securing the ID, did not show a severe burden in actually voting.
In using the lower standard of review as dictated by Burdick,
the court indicated that the test was to
weigh ‘the character and magnitude of the asserted injury
to the rights protected by the First and Fourteenth
Amendments that the plaintiff seeks to vindicate’ against
‘the precise interests put forward by the State as
justifications for the burden imposed by its rule,’ taking
into consideration ‘the extent to which those interests
172
make it necessary to burden the plaintiff’s rights.
Thus, the court balanced the state’s interest in preventing
173
Here, the court found
fraud against the plaintiffs’ voting rights.
no evidence of a significant burden on voting, specifically pointing
out that the plaintiffs could not name a single person burdened by
174
the new law.
The court found that the Brace report was
175
ignored the Hershey study, and
inadmissible or unreliable,
176
concluded that it is not difficult to obtain a photo ID. Overall, it

167. Id. at 809–20. This article passes over the extensive discussion of
plaintiffs’ standing found in these pages.
168. Id. at 820.
169. Id. at 821.
170. Id. at 822.
171. Id. at 822–23.
172. Id. at 821 (quoting Burdick, 504 U.S. at 434).
173. See id. at 825-26 (remarking that requiring a photo ID to vote was no
different than similar requirements to cashing a check).
174. Id. at 822–23.
175. Id. at 823–24.
176. Id. at 824–25.
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saw no evidence to outweigh the state’s interest, and therefore it
upheld the law against the First and Fourteenth Amendment
178
challenges.
The Seventh Circuit opinion upheld and followed the district
court analysis. While noting initially that many people choose not
to vote for a variety of reasons (and therefore presumably would
179
not be burdened by the photo ID requirement), the court
rejected the application of strict scrutiny, again preferring to use
the weighing test articulated in Burdick when regulations do not
180
impose a severe burden. As the court effectuated the balance:
On the other side of the balance is voting fraud,
specifically the form of voting fraud in which a person
shows up at the polls claiming to be someone elsesomeone who has left the district, or died, too recently to
have been removed from the list of registered voters, or
181
someone who has not voted yet on election day.
This interest must be weighed against “the effect of requiring a
photo ID in inducing eligible voters to disfranchise themselves.
182
Given this
That effect, so far as the record reveals, is slight.”
balance and the fact that, according to the court, voter fraud is
hard to detect and is often viewed as a minor, poorly prosecuted
crime, it is reasonable for the state to require voter IDs, even if
183
there is no evidence of such fraud in Indiana.
There are several characteristics core to the opinions of both
the district court and the Seventh Circuit. First, the cases accepted
that the state interest in preventing fraud was valid, even if no
empirical evidence of false identity at the polls could be
documented in the state. As a fallback position, the courts
contended that evidence from other jurisdictions was sufficient or
that abating potential fraud was a permissible interest. Second, the
cases dismissed evidence of a significant burden on voting rights,
finding that, at best, it was difficult but not impossible to get a state177. Id. at 826. The court rejected the assertion that the state had to provide
empirical evidence of fraud to support its interest, but were there such a mandate,
enough evidence from other jurisdictions existed to sustain it. Id.
178. Id. at 830.
179. Crawford v. Marion County Election Bd., 472 F.3d 949, 951 (7th Cir.
2007).
180. Id. at 952.
181. Id. at 953.
182. Id. at 952.
183. See id. at 953.
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issued ID that would meet the requirements of SEA. Third,
because the burden was not significant, strict scrutiny was not
required (following Burdick). Finally, weighing state interests
against the slight burden of the photo ID, courts upheld the latter.
Other cases likely to uphold state voter ID laws would probably
include points similar to these.
B. Michigan and In re Request for Advisory Opinion Regarding
Constitutionality of 2005 PA 71
The issue in Michigan was the state and federal
constitutionality of 2005 PA 71, a state law that requires either
presentation of a photo ID when voting or signing an affidavit
184
The
stating that one does not have the required identification.
Michigan Supreme Court, in an advisory opinion, found the law to
185
be constitutional under the Burdick balancing test.
186
In 1996, the state adopted a voter photo identification law.
Before that law took effect, the Michigan Attorney General issued
an advisory opinion concluding that, lacking evidence of
substantial voter fraud in the state, the requirement was
unconstitutional because it did not advance a compelling state
187
interest. But as a result of events, such as those surrounding the
188
2000 presidential election, the state reenacted the voter ID law in
the form of 2005 PA 71. Upon request from the Michigan House of
Representatives, which is permitted to ask for an advisory opinion,
the Michigan Supreme Court invited briefs to determine the facial
189
constitutionality of 2005 PA 71.
As in the Indiana case, the Michigan Supreme Court began its
analysis by declaring that the right to vote is fundamental but not
190
absolute.
The court noted that in the state’s constitution the
Legislature was given the authority to “enact laws to preserve the purity
of elections, to preserve the secrecy of the ballot, to guard against
abuses of the elective franchise, and to provide for a system of voter

184. In re Request for Advisory Opinion Regarding Constitutionality of 2005
PA 71, 740 N.W.2d 444, 449 (Mich. 2007).
185. Id. at 469 (citing Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428 (1992)).
186. Id. at 448.
187. Id.
188. Id. at 449
189. Id.
190. Id. at 450.
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191

registration and absentee voting.”
The court noted that the
purpose of this constitutional language was to grant the state the
192
power to prevent fraudulent voting.
The Court also noted that
under federal jurisprudence states were given the authority to
193
regulate their own elections in order to prevent fraud and to
194
protect the right of lawful voters to exercise their franchise.
Thus, while the Michigan Supreme Court indicated that
fundamental rights generally must be examined under strict
195
scrutiny, the United States Supreme Court rejected that analysis
as applied to election law, preferring instead the more “flexible
196
According to the Michigan
standard” as articulated in Burdick.
Supreme Court, the first step is to determine
the nature and magnitude of the claimed restriction
inflicted by the election law on the right to vote, weighed
against the precise interest identified by the state. If the
burden on the right to vote is severe, then the regulation
must be “narrowly drawn” to further a compelling state
interest. However, if the restriction imposed is reasonable
and nondiscriminatory, then the law is upheld as
warranted by the important regulatory interest identified
197
by the state.
The court quickly disposed of the burden question. It noted
that the burden is slight: “[2005 PA 71] merely requires the
presentation of photo identification that the voter already
198
The court stated that the Attorney General did not
possesses.”
claim that the photo ID requirement burdens voters who already
have an ID but merely that it might do so for those lacking the ID
199
at present. The court quickly disposed of this objection by stating
that the alternative to the photo ID is signing an affidavit, which
200
itself is not burdensome.
Hence, the court used the more
201
flexible standard under Burdick to analyze the ID requirement.

191. Id. at 453 (quoting MICH. CONST. art. II, § 4).
192. Id.
193. Id. at 454 (citing inter alia, Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 433 (1992)).
194. Id.
195. Id. at 455.
196. Id.
197. Id. at 455–56.
198. Id. at 456.
199. Id.
200. Id. at 457.
201. Id. at 469.
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The court thus weighed the state’s constitutional interest in
preventing fraud against what it perceived as the slight burden of
the voter ID requirement. It found that the article II, section 4
state constitutional requirements to preserve the purity of the
202
elections and to guard against abuses were compelling interests.
In addition, the court noted that the state was not required to
provide empirical evidence of voter fraud and that instead it may
203
Even if some proof is
take prophylactic action to prevent it.
demanded, however, the court said that in-person fraud is covert
and hard to detect, and therefore it could not see how such proof
204
could be undertaken. Thus, under the Burdick flexible standard,
the Michigan Supreme Court upheld 2005 PA 71 against federal
205
constitutional challenges and found that it was not a violation of
206
207
Finally, similar to the Indiana case, the
the state constitution.
court rejected the claim that the photo ID was an unconstitutional
poll tax, finding that no fee was required to vote, and that, in any
208
event, there was an affidavit bypass.
C. Georgia and Common Cause/Georgia v. Billups
In 2005, the Georgia Legislature adopted and the governor
209
signed House Bill 244, or Act 53 (“HB 244”), requiring all
registered voters in Georgia who vote at the polls in person to
present a government-issued photo ID to election officials before
210
being allowed to vote.
Subsequently, the state adopted the 2006
Photo ID Act (“the 2006 Act”), which repealed the 2005
211
amendment and replaced it with nearly identical language.
The
one difference between the 2005 amendment and the 2006 Act was
that the latter also required the Board of Elections in each county
202. Id. at 455.
203. Id. at 458.
204. Id. at 458 n.64.
205. Id. at 459.
206. Id. at 463.
207. See Crawford v. Marion County Election Bd., 472 F.3d 949, 952 (7th Cir.
2007).
208. Constitutionality of 2005 PA 71, 740 N.W.2d at 466.
209. Common Cause/Ga. v. Billups, 504 F. Supp. 2d 1333, 1342 (N.D. Ga.
2005). HB 244 amended O.C.G.A. § 21-2-417, which did not require the
production of a government-issued ID but instead allowed it among several other
forms of proof of identification to be used when voting in person. See GA. CODE
ANN. § 21-2-417 (2007).
210. Common Cause/Ga., 504 F. Supp. 2d at 1342.
211. Id.
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to issue a Georgia photo voter identification card without charge to
212
This
voters upon presentation of certain identifying documents.
changed the law’s previous requirement that individuals complete
213
an affidavit of indigency if they could not afford the ID.
For
individuals who did not have a state driver’s license, the 2006 Act
also listed numerous other acceptable identifying documents,
214
including passports and military or tribal IDs.
Finally, the 2006
Act also mandated that each county issue IDs for a minimum of
215
eight hours each day of the week before election day.
Common Cause Georgia, the NAACP, and several individuals
challenged the 2006 Act as a violation of the Fourteenth and
216
Twenty-Fourth Amendment rights to vote and as a poll tax. They
also alleged various state constitutional claims and sought a
217
preliminary injunction to halt enforcement of the law. Following
a rather complicated history of litigation in both state and federal
218
courts, a federal district court upheld the 2006 Act and rejected
219
demands to enjoin its enforcement.
In reviewing the case, the district court began its substantive
legal analysis on the constitutionality of the 2006 Act by affirming
220
The court found that the
that voting is a fundamental right.
right to vote is not absolute, but that the state cannot unduly
221
burden that right. The question for the court was what test to use
to determine an undue burden. After recounting several
222
possibilities, it settled on the Burdick flexible standard approach.

212. Id.
213. Id. at 1343; see also GA. CODE ANN. § 40-5-103 (2007).
214. Common Cause/Ga., 504 F. Supp. 2d at 1343.
215. Id. at 1346.
216. Id. at 1337–42.
217. Id at 1337.
218. Id. at 1337–42. The Plaintiffs filed several complaints and amended
motions for temporary and permanent injunctions. Id.
219. Id. at 1382–83.
220. Common Cause/Ga. v. Billups, 504 F. Supp. 2d 1333, 1375 (N.D. Ga.
2005).
221. Id.
222. Id. at 1376.
The Court finds that the appropriate standard of review for evaluating
the 2006 Photo ID Act is the Burdick sliding scale standard. Under that
standard, the Court must weigh “the character and magnitude of the
asserted injury to the rights protected by the First and Fourteenth
Amendments that the plaintiff seeks to vindicate” against “the precise
interests put forward by the State as justifications for the burden imposed
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Interestingly, in arriving at this standard, the court implicitly
rejected claims that the restriction of the 2006 Act’s ID
requirement was severe, therefore making the more flexible
223
weighing approach the appropriate standard for review.
In terms of the State’s interests, the court noted that “[t]he
State and the State Defendants assert that the 2006 Act’s photo ID
224
requirement is designed to curb voting fraud.”
In looking to
ascertain instances of voter fraud in Georgia, the court’s findings of
fact acknowledge statements by the Secretary of State that in the
previous ten years the “office received no reports of voter
impersonation involving a scenario in which a voter appeared at
the polls and voted as another person, and the actual person later
225
appeared at the polls and attempted to vote as himself.”
The
Secretary of State also declared that the “photo ID requirement for
in-person voting was unnecessary, created a significant obstacle to
226
voting for many voters,” and that absentee voting was the source
227
of many of the problems. Despite these acknowledgments by the
Secretary, the court dismissed them along with the need for the
228
state to provide evidence of voting fraud.
Instead, the court
noted that because it was not applying strict scrutiny, the state did
not have to offer empirical support and, moreover, “the legislature
has wide latitude in determining the problems it wishes to address
229
and the manner in which it desires to address them.”
In weighing this state interest against the injury to the
plaintiffs’ right to vote, the court noted that the burden to the
230
231
It noted that the ID is free, that each
latter is not severe.

by its rule,” taking into consideration “the extent to which those interests
make it necessary to burden the plaintiff's rights.”
Id. at 1377 (citing Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 433–34 (1992).
223. Id. at 1377 (analyzing the two tier approach to voting regulations but then
simply adopting the flexible standard without explaining why the burden is not
severe).
224. Id. at 1381.
225. Id. at 1356.
226. Common Cause/Ga. v. Billups, 504 F. Supp. 2d 1333, 1357 (N.D. Ga.
2005).
227. See id.
228. See id. at 1382.
229. Id. at 1381–82 (quoting Ind. Democratic Party v. Rokita, 458 F. Supp. 2d
775, 829 (S.D. Ind. 2006)).
230. Id. at 1380.
231. Id. at 1379.
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232

county has an office that is easily accessible to secure the ID, and
that none of the plaintiffs who were granted standing would have
233
difficulty securing the ID.
It also pointed out that a public
education program to inform voters about the ID requirements was
234
Thus, the court refused to
aimed at mitigating the burdens.
235
grant the injunction.
D. Arizona and Gonzalez v. Arizona
236

Gonzalez v. Arizona is the fourth instance where the courts
have decided to permit states to go forward with an ID law. At issue
here was an ID law enacted as Proposition 200 via a ballot initiative
237
in 2004. Proposition 200 required “persons wishing to register to
vote for the first time in Arizona to present proof of citizenship and
to require all Arizona voters to present identification when they
238
vote in person at the polls.”
A coalition of groups challenged it,
claiming the measure was a poll tax that violated the Fourteenth
Amendment Equal Protection Clause and the right to vote; they
239
also claimed that it violated the Voting Rights Act. The plaintiffs
sought to enjoin enforcement of Proposition 200 before the 2006
240
election and were initially rejected by a federal district court
241
The
which rejected the parallels between an ID and a poll tax.
court also indicated that the factual record necessary to show a
242
burden on voting rights had not been developed.
The Ninth
243
Circuit reversed and granted the injunction, but the Supreme
Court vacated the stay and remanded the case back to the court of
244
appeals.
In its reasoning, the Supreme Court noted that while
the right to vote was important, so too was addressing voter fraud; it
also noted that the Ninth Circuit had failed to give reasons for why
232. See id. at 1343.
233. Id. at 1379.
234. Id. at 1380.
235. Id. at 1383.
236. 485 F.3d 1041 (9th Cir. 2007).
237. Id. at 1046.
238. Id.
239. Id.
240. Gonzalez v. Ariz., No. CV 06-1268-PHX, 2006 WL 3627297 (D. Ariz. Sept.
11, 2006).
241. Id. at *4–5.
242. Gonzalez v. Ariz., 485 F.3d 1041, 1048 (9th Cir. 2007).
243. Id. at 1046.
244. Purcell v. Gonzalez, 127 S. Ct. 5, 8 (2006).
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245

On remand, the Ninth Circuit
it reversed the lower court.
246
upheld the district court’s denial of preliminary injunctive relief.
In upholding the photo ID law, the Ninth Circuit quickly
rejected the poll tax argument by distinguishing showing
247
identification from paying a fee.
In the Virginia case Harman v.
248
Forssenius, the right to vote was “abridged . . . by reason of failure
249
In Arizona, however, voters need only show
to pay the poll tax.”
250
proof of citizenship, which does not constitute a form of poll tax.
Next, the court, drawing upon Burdick, indicated that they need not
use strict scrutiny in this case because the plaintiffs failed to show
how the ID requirement imposed a severe burden upon the right
251
Thus, examining Proposition 200 under the more
to vote.
flexible Burdick standard, the court found that four affidavits of
individuals claiming to be burdened by the photo ID law were
252
insufficient or inappropriate to show the hardship claimed.
Since the plaintiffs were unable to provide a record to show the
alleged harms, the Ninth Circuit upheld the decision of the district
253
court to deny the injunction.
E. Missouri and Weinschenk v. Missouri
Among the initial challenges to photo ID laws, Weinschenk v.
254
Missouri was the only decision invaliding this voting requirement
using strict scrutiny. At issue was SB 1014, a Missouri photo ID
255
SB 1014 amended state law,
requirement, adopted in 2006.
mandating that as a condition of voting “Missourians present as
identification a document issued by the state or federal
governments that contains the person’s name as listed in the voter
registration records, the person’s photograph, and an expiration
256
date showing that the ID is not expired.”
According to the
245.
246.
247.
248.
249.
250.
251.
252.
253.
254.
255.
256.

Id. at 7–8.
See Gonzalez, 485 F.3d at 1047.
Id. at 1049.
380 U.S. 528 (1965).
Id. at 529.
Gonzalez, 485 F.3d at 1049.
Id. at 1049–50.
See id. at 1050–51.
See id. at 1052.
203 S.W.3d 201 (Mo. 2006).
See id. at 205.
Id. (citing MO. REV. STAT. § 115.427.1 (Supp. 2006)).
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Missouri Supreme Court, the change in the law effectively meant
that for most residents, only a state-issued driver’s or non-driver’s
license or United States passport would be considered an
257
acceptable ID.
Voters challenged SB 1014 as a poll tax, both as
First and Fourteenth Amendment claims, and as a violation of
258
various provisions of the Missouri Constitution.
The Missouri
Supreme Court sustained the challenges.
Two points are critical to the decision in Weinschenk that
distinguish it from the other cases upholding voter ID laws. First,
the court noted that the case
stands in stark contrast to the Georgia and Indiana cases,
for their decisions were largely based on those courts’
findings that the parties had simply presented theoretical
arguments and had failed to offer specific evidence of
voters who were required to bear these costs in order to
259
exercise their right to vote.
In this case, plaintiffs provided the empirical evidence to show
the actual burden that the ID would cause. They documented the
real costs in terms of what it would take to obtain proper
260
Specifically, the court noted that in some
identification to vote.
cases, the plaintiffs would have to pay $11 for a non-driver’s license
261
Documenting real costs
and up to $20 for a birth certificate.
proved an actual burden; thus, the court was convinced that the
262
severe burdens test as mandated in Burdick had been met.
Second, the court emphasized that notwithstanding Burdick, the
photo ID requirement must be examined under the Missouri State
Constitution, which appeared to offer more protection for the right
263
The
to vote than found under the federal Constitution.
combination of empirical documentation and appeal to state
constitutional law led the court to reach conclusions contrary to
the decisions in Indiana, Georgia, Michigan, and Arizona.
In its analysis of SB 1014, the Missouri court highlighted
several burdens that the law imposed upon its citizens. First, it
noted that:

257. Id. at 205–06.
258. See id. at 204.
259. Id. at 214.
260. Id. at 206–10.
261. Id. at 208.
262. See id. at 216.
263. See id. at 212–14.
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[B]etween 3 and 4 percent of Missouri citizens lack the
requisite photo ID and would, thus, need to obtain a
driver’s or non-driver’s license or a passport in order to
vote. Specifically, the trial court noted that the Secretary
of State’s analysis in August 2006 estimated that
approximately 240,000 registered voters may not have the
required photo ID and that the Department of Revenue’s
estimate of the same was approximately 169,215
individuals. Each of these forms of ID, however, normally
costs money to obtain. This presents a practical problem
for Missourians who will be discouraged from attempting
to vote because of concern that they must pay a fee to do
264
so.
In calculating how many lacked current IDs, the court could
rely upon statistics that did not seem in dispute, unlike in Indiana
where the record was unclear as to how many individuals would be
265
Second, as noted above,
burdened by the new ID requirement.
the court was able to attach real dollar costs to securing
identification; e.g., fees for driver’s and non-driver’s licenses and
266
Third, the court considered non-monetary
birth certificates.
costs, such as time and ability to navigate bureaucracies in order to
267
obtain the necessary identification to vote, an especially difficult
268
process for the elderly and handicapped.
In addition, the court
noted the burden the law would place upon those born out of state
seeking to obtain the required birth certificate necessary to obtain
269
the approved ID.
The Missouri Supreme Court showed several instances where
obtaining a driver’s or non-driver’s license would cost time, effort,
and money.
Nevertheless, under the new law these eligible registered
voters will not be able to cast a regular ballot (or after
2008 any ballot at all) unless they undertake to obtain one
of the requisite photo IDs. This will constitute a dramatic
increase in provisional ballots over the previous law, as
only 8,000 provisional ballots were cast statewide in the
2004 general election. As conceded by Appellants, denial

264. Id. at 206.
265. Id. at 214 n.21.
266. See id. at 206, 214.
267. See id. at 215.
268. See id.
269. Id. at 211.
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of the right to vote to these Missourians is more than a de
270
minimis burden on their suffrage.
Thus, the court was able to document the real costs and
burdens to Missourian voters associated with the new ID
requirement. These costs, for the court, were sufficient for it to
find that the photo ID requirement was an unconstitutional poll
271
tax.
Next, applying strict scrutiny, the court mandated that the
state show a narrowly tailored compelling interest to support SB
272
1014.
The court conceded that although combating fraud is
273
compelling, the state failed to make that demonstration. First,
the state could not show that recent elections had serious problems
274
with fraud.
Second, the fraud that did exist was not associated
275
Instead,
with voter impersonation but with absentee voting.
according to the court:
To the contrary, Appellants concede that the only type of
voter fraud that the Photo-ID Requirement prevents is inperson voter impersonation fraud at the polling place. It
does not address absentee voting fraud or fraud in
registration. While the Photo-ID Requirement may
provide some additional protection against voter
impersonation fraud, the evidence below demonstrates
that the Photo-ID Requirement is not “necessary” to
accomplish this goal. As the trial court found: “No
evidence was presented that voter impersonation fraud
exists to any substantial degree in Missouri. In fact, the
evidence that was presented indicates that voter
276
impersonation fraud is not a problem in Missouri.”
Thus, while the interest in addressing fraud is compelling, the
lack of evidence for the type of fraud to be remedied by the ID
requirement meant that the state’s interest was neither narrowly

270. Id. at 213.
271. Id. at 214–15.
272. See id. at 215–16.
273. Id. at 217.
274. Id. at 210 (stating that “the record contains two letters written in 2004 by
then-Secretary of State Matt Blunt on the subject of voter fraud. He described
Missouri's statewide elections in 2002 and 2004 to then-Governor Bob Holden as
‘two of the cleanest and problem free elections in recent history.’ To the St. Louis
Post-Dispatch, Blunt characterized the same elections as ‘fraud-free.’”).
275. Id. at 218 n.28.
276. Id. at 217.

Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2008

35

William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 34, Iss. 2 [2008], Art. 2
2. SCHULTZ - ADC.DOC.DOCM

518

WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW

1/31/2008 10:30:03 AM

[Vol. 34:2
277

tailored nor compelling enough to survive strict scrutiny. Hence,
SB 1014 was found to be unconstitutional under state
278
constitutional clauses.
F.

Albuquerque, New Mexico and Women Voters of
Albuquerque/Bernalillo County v. Santillanes
279

American Civil Liberties Union of New Mexico v. Santillanes is a
second case where a court struck down a photo ID requirement.
But unlike Weinschenk, where state constitutional law and strict
scrutiny were used, the federal district court in Santillanes employed
the U.S. Constitution and the flexible standard under Burdick to
invalidate the requirement.
At issue in Santillanes was a 2005 amendment to the City of
Albuquerque, New Mexico Election Code mandating that its
citizens present a valid photo ID when voting at the polls in future
280
municipal elections. The requirement excluded absentee ballots,
281
and it was adopted, according to the city, to address voter fraud.
The plaintiffs sought an injunction to bar enforcement of the
amendment, contending that the photo ID requirement was an
282
The district court
unconstitutional burden on voting rights.
judge agreed, granting an injunction under both First and
283
Fourteenth Amendment (Equal Protection) grounds.
Judge Armijo began her analysis of the 2005 amendment by
noting that the case involved striking a balance between the right
to vote and the city’s right to regulate elections in order to prevent
284
Judge Armijo recognized that voting was a
voter fraud.
285
fundamental right under both the state and federal constitutions.
The plaintiffs called for strict scrutiny based on voting as a
286
fundamental right.
But the Court agreed with Burdick’s
requirement to base the level of scrutiny upon the severity of the

277. Id. at 217–19.
278. Id. at 221–22.
279. 506 F. Supp. 2d 598 (D.N.M. 2007).
280. Id. at 606 (addressing the constitutionality of Albuquerque, N.M., City
Charter art. XIII, §14 (amended 2005)).
281. Id.
282. Id.
283. See id. at 645.
284. Id. at 606.
285. Id. at 627.
286. Id. at 626.
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287

burden imposed.
Similarly, the judge rejected the use of a
rational basis test to examine the 2005 amendment, finding that
the inability to predict the actual injury to voting rights requires
288
more than a minimal level of analysis.
Hence, the district court
interpreted the Burdick test to require a more intermediate level of
analysis, balancing the state interest against the severity of the
289
burden on voting rights.
By employing this test, the court agreed that preventing voter
290
fraud is a compelling or important governmental interest.
The
court rejected the notion that simple assertion of this interest will
suffice.
[T]he Burdick test does not call for the Court to look for
any conceivable, generalized interest that might serve as a
justification for imposing a burden on the exercise of First
and Fourteenth Amendment rights in the context of
elections. Rather, this test calls for the City to put forward
“the precise interests [which serve] as justifications for the
burden imposed by its rule,” taking into consideration
“the extent to which those interests make it necessary to
291
burden the plaintiff’s rights.”
As the court interpreted the Burdick test, the weighing of state
interests and the burden on voting rights required the city to “bear
the burden of providing a reasoned explanation, supported by at
least some admissible evidence, to show the October 2005
amendment is tailored to advance an important governmental
292
interest.”
The judge noted that the 2005 Amendment referred
only to one instance of alleged voter impersonation, but otherwise,
no admissible evidence was put forward to support its contentions
293
Furthermore, the court responded to claims, as
of voter fraud.
similarly made by Indiana, that the law should be upheld as a valid
294
measure to prevent the possibility of fraud. Yet unlike in Indiana,
where the state conceded that it was not up to date in maintenance
of its voter-registration rolls, there was no indication or argument
287. Id. at 628.
288. Id. at 626.
289. Id. at 628.
290. Id. at 636.
291. Id. at 637 (citation omitted).
292. Id. at 636.
293. Id. at 637.
294. Id. (citing Crawford v. Marion County Election Bd., 472 F.3d 949, 953–54
(7th Cir. 2007)).
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being offered by the city or the state that this was a problem in New
295
In fact, New Mexico had recently acted to improve its
Mexico.
296
record keeping. Thus, the possibility of voter fraud was found to
297
Finally, the court addressed whether
be without merit.
preventing future impersonation fraud would support the voter ID
298
requirement.
Even if this was valid, the court found that
exempting absentee voting from the ID requirement undermined
299
Employing
claims that it was attempting to address voter fraud.
intermediate level analysis, the judge stated:
My conclusion that the October 2005 City Charter
amendment lacks a plausible, close-fitting relationship to
the actual prevention of voter impersonation fraud does
not imply that all laws which seek to prevent fraud in the
conduct of elections suffer from the same defects. In this
regard, the 2005 amendments to the State Election Code
provide an example of a law that provides less restrictive
alternatives for identifying voters at the polls while at the
same time leaving fewer loopholes available for stealing
300
another person’s vote.
On one side of the scale, the judge found that there was no
301
weight to the city’s contention of voter fraud. In comparison, she
found that the ID requirement placed several burdens on the
plaintiffs’ voting rights, including concerns about whether their
votes will be counted because their photo IDs may be rejected, and
that they will not have enough time to vote absentee or secure
302
The judge also cited the Missouri Supreme
other identification.
Court for noting the bureaucratic and other real costs associated
303
with securing the required IDs. Unlike Georgia, the city had not
undertaken a significant education program to inform voters about
304
305
the new voting requirements.
For all of these reasons, the
295. Id. at 638.
296. Id.
297. Id. at 638.
298. Id.
299. Id.
300. Id. at 640.
301. Id. at 615–17.
302. Id. at 635.
303. Id. at 634.
304. Id. at 634–35.
305. See id. at 634 (citing Buckley v. Am. Constitutional Law Found., Inc., 525
U.S. 182, 197-200 (1999) (supporting the claim that bureaucratic costs associated
with securing an ID may constitute a severe burden. Here the judge argued that
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court found the new ID law to be a burden on plaintiffs’ voting
306
Assessing the weight of the city’s claims of voter fraud
rights.
against the significant burden on voting rights, the court enjoined
the new photo ID requirement on both First and Fourteenth
307
Amendment grounds.
G. Summary
The courts upheld voter ID laws in four of the six jurisdictions
litigating them. In these four cases each court relied upon the
flexible standard test articulated in Burdick, and using federal
constitutional analysis they ruled that ID requirements are not a
severe burden on voting rights, thereby precluding the need to use
strict scrutiny. Once invoking a lesser standard of analysis, all four
of the cases outweighed the state interest in controlling or
addressing voter fraud against any of the burdens associated with
photo identification. The courts consistently did not demand that
the states provide empirical evidence to support or document state
interests, instead allowing them broad leeway to enact preventive
measures. But when the courts looked to the evidence to support
the states’ interests, they permitted out of state information, relied
upon sources of questionable value (such as John Fund’s Stealing
Elections), or allowed other accounts of fraud not directly tied into
in–person voting at the polls to suffice as acceptable proof. In the
Indiana and Arizona cases, even evidence or concessions by
defendants that fraud did not exist did not seem to matter to the
courts.
Conversely, while the states have not been held to a rigid
standard of proof, the plaintiffs have. Plaintiffs have been asked to
show with particularity how the new photo ID requirement
burdened their ability to vote, with the courts generally dismissing
time or effort factors surrounding obtaining the necessary ID. The
courts also seem to have emphasized that some voting
identification cards are free through an indigent bypass process, or
whether there are provisional voting processes that get around the
ID requirement, at least enough to escape claims that the new laws
constitute a poll tax. Thus, weighing an almost unquestioned state
the issue in Buckley—requiring petition gatherers to wear ID badges—imposed a
severe burden upon the First Amendment free speech rights of these
individuals)).
306. Id. at 636.
307. Id. at 645.
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interest against an unsubstantiated asserted burden on the right to
vote under a less than exacting if not almost a rational basis
scrutiny, it is no surprise that the courts have upheld the ID
requirements.
But the litigation in Missouri and New Mexico paint
contrasting pictures. The Missouri Supreme Court both rejects the
Burdick framework and invokes state constitutional law to use strict
scrutiny. Conversely, in New Mexico, the Burdick test is read as an
intermediate level analysis. In both instances, the courts found that
the evidence to support the state interest did not survive scrutiny.
Despite the Missouri and New Mexico rulings, the implications
of the litigation in Indiana, Michigan, Georgia, and Arizona are not
hopeful for voting rights advocates. They suggest that the courts
will be receptive to photo ID laws for voting, potentially paving the
way for the next great disenfranchisement based upon conjecture
and unsubstantiated stories of fraud.
V. FIGHTING DISENFRANCHISEMENT: LESSONS FOR LITIGATING
FUTURE PHOTO ID CASES
Given the track record of litigation, should voting rights
advocates simply abandon all hope of challenging photo ID
requirements and resign themselves to the reality of either a new
disenfranchisement or a strategy that seeks to make the best of a
possibly bad voting situation? Not necessarily. While the case law
so far has not been promising, both Weinschenk and Santillanes, as
well as dicta and dissents in the other cases, offer some suggestions
on a better strategy in challenging both the ID laws in the four
states that have already upheld them and in others contemplating
adoption. Moreover, voting rights supporters need to be prepared
to engage the Burdick test, demonstrating flaws in both its logic and
in its application.
A. Lessons from the Photo ID Laws Already Litigated
While four losses out of six is not a good track record, the
victories in Missouri and New Mexico and the dicta in the other
cases, especially Gonzalez and the dissent in the Michigan case, offer
some important lessons that could prove useful in the future. One
way to challenge photo ID laws is to continue to assert that
regulations on voting rights require strict scrutiny. Conversely, one
should argue that even under Burdick’s flexible standard, the
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burden on rights outweighs any purported state interest. Ideally,
one should argue both as alternative theories. On top of this, one
should argue that these issues be raised both at the federal and
state constitutional level.
Weinschenk is an important victory because it demonstrates how
one needs to present a challenge to these laws by using strict
scrutiny. Weinschenk is also an example of how state law may be an
308
important source of opposing photo ID laws. The courts rejected
state challenges in Michigan and to some extent in Georgia. The
Missouri Supreme Court distinguished the jurisprudence of its
voting rights cases under the Missouri constitution from that found
309
at the federal level. In drawing upon its own jurisprudence, it was
able to bypass the Burdick analysis, finding that under its own
constitution, infringements on the right to vote must be examined
310
In fact, the state constitution appeared to
under strict scrutiny.
offer a compelling state interest to efforts to protect the right to
311
vote. The shift in level of scrutiny was critical to the challenge to
SB 1014, forcing the State to defend its interest in fraud as
compelling and real and as narrowly tailored to abating fraud at
312
the polls. The first simple lesson from Weinschenk is that state law
matters and that the new judicial federalism may be beneficial to
313
voting rights advocates.
Second, plaintiffs in Weinschenk documented the real costs and
burdens imposed upon them by the photo ID law. As the Missouri
Supreme Court pointed out, the litigation in this case was different
from the case in Indiana because it could point to real as opposed
314
to hypothetical burdens upon plaintiffs.
In part, the challenges
failed in the other states because either they were facial challenges
to the ID laws or because plaintiffs had not properly and
sufficiently documented the real costs or burdens in terms of dollar
amounts or numbers of individuals affected by the new voting
308. See also In re Request for Advisory Opinion Regarding Constitutionality of
2005 PA 71, 740 N.W.2d 444, 460 (Mich. 2007) (Kelly, J., dissenting) (invoking the
Michigan Constitution in ruling on the voter ID law).
309. Weinschenk v. State, 203 S.W.3d 201, 211 (Mo. 2006).
310. Id. at 215.
311. Id. at 203.
312. Id. at 217.
313. See generally David Schultz, Redistricting and the New Judicial Federalism:
Reapportionment Litigation Under State Constitutions, 37 RUTGERS L. J. 1087 (2006)
(discussing how state constitutions are becoming increasingly important in the
litigation of election law issues).
314. Weinschenck, 203 S.W.3d at 214.
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requirements. In Missouri, plaintiffs presented both in pressing
315
The value in doing this was twofold. First, in
their arguments.
Weinschenk, it made it possible to demonstrate how under the
Burdick dicta the burdens were severe and therefore strict scrutiny
316
Second, using the flexible weighing standard
was required.
under Burdick, it is possible to calculate the actual documentation
317
of burden in the analysis.
In looking at the failure of the
plaintiffs to prevail in Gonzalez v. Arizona, the courts on several
occasions noted that the burdens of the new law had yet to be
318
proven.
The Supreme Court, in overturning the Ninth Circuit’s
319
In fact, Justice Stevens, in writing
injunction, said the same.
separately on the vacating and remanding, essentially cautioned
plaintiffs to secure the data necessary to demonstrate the burdens
to voting rights.
Allowing the election to proceed without enjoining the
statutory provisions at issue will provide the courts with a
better record on which to judge their constitutionality. At
least two important factual issues remain largely
unresolved: the scope of the disenfranchisement that the
novel identification requirements will produce, and the
prevalence and character of the fraudulent practices that
allegedly justify those requirements. Given the importance
of the constitutional issues, the Court wisely takes action
that will enhance the likelihood that they will be resolved
correctly on the basis of historical facts rather than
320
speculation.
Thus, perhaps the second piece of good advice that emerges
from the litigation so far is that challenges to photo ID
requirements must either be as applied or plaintiffs must be able to
provide a picture of the real burdens associated with them.
In contrast to arguing that state law or the level of burden on
voting rights demands strict scrutiny, Santillanes took seriously the
321
flexible standard test of Burdick and argued the burdens.
The
315. Id. at 204–10.
316. See id. at 215–17.
317. See id. at 204–10.
318. See e.g., 485 F.3d 1041, 1049–50 (9th Cir. 2007); see also Common
Cause/Georgia v. Billups, 504 F. Supp. 2d 1333, 1382 (contending not enough
evidence presented to show a severe burden).
319. Purcell v. Gonzalez, 127 S.Ct. 5, 7–8 (2006).
320. Id. at 8.
321. 506 F. Supp. 2d 598, (D.N.M. 2007). Cf. In re Request for Advisory
Opinion Regarding Constitutionality of 2005 PA 71, 740 N.W.2d 444, 456–57
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judge in this case considered what the test seems to be about when
applied, i.e., that a test advocating weighing the relative strength of
state interests versus burdens on voting rights requires, in fact, a
real weighing. Specifically, the Santillanes court gave similar careful
consideration to the idea that a government cannot assert an
interest without documenting evidence assessing it in light of the
322
available evidence on burdens.
In the four cases upholding the
ID laws, the courts did not really appear to be applying the flexible
Burdick standard by engaging in an empirical weighing of interests
and burdens. Finally, the judge in Santillanes demonstrated a way
to handle facial challenges to the ID laws. Here, Judge Armijo
indicated that real demonstrated burdens to rights might constitute
severe burdens necessitating strict scrutiny; but if the burdens are
not certain, then rational basis review is not appropriate and some
intermediate level of analysis is a better way to protect a
323
fundamental right when anticipating possible burdens.
Overall, to challenge voter ID laws, one should raise claims
under federal and state law; one should argue both for strict and
intermediate levels of analysis; and one should seek a challenge
that invokes facial arguments as well as documents the burdens,
while still advocating for an intermediate level of scrutiny.
B. Challenging the Burdick Test
A far more fundamental problem in the photo ID litigation is
the Burdick test itself. Both in its theoretical structure and in its
application, there are flaws on numerous grounds, presenting
litigants with an opportunity to challenge its use.
Perhaps the first problem with the test is that the four courts
upholding voter ID laws have let the government assert voter fraud
as a compelling governmental interest without documenting that
such an interest is real or based on appropriate evidence. In fact,
in the decisions upholding the photo ID cases, the courts have
324
As
generally done a poor job reviewing or handling evidence.
(Mich. 2007) (Cavanagh, J. dissenting) (using the same flexible standard test but
imposing little to no burden on the state).
322. Santillanes, 506 F. Supp. 2d. at 615–18.
323. See id. at 633–35 (examining the Missouri photo ID law under a less than
strict scrutiny approach).
324. See generally Daniel P. Tokaji, Leave it to the Lower Courts: On Judicial
Intervention and Administration, 68 OHIO ST. L. J. 1065 (2007) (discussing a similar
point).
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the district court judge stated in Billups: “the legislature has wide
latitude in determining the problems it wishes to address and the
325
manner in which it desires to address them.”
There are several
problems with this approach.
First, the Supreme Court in election law cases has not stated
that the compelling interest may be simply asserted without
empirical foundations. Instead, evidence must be offered to
326
For
support the interest to override a fundamental right.
327
example, in Buckley v. Valeo, the Court first reviewed a series of
328
proffered claims to limit political contributions or expenditures.
In doing so it rejected several interests—such as equalizing voices
329
or speech—as illegitimate interests.
Second, once the Court
accepted one interest as compelling—preventing corruption or the
appearance of corruption—it demanded that some evidence be
330
The importance of this evidence was
offered to support it.
331
where
underscored in Nixon v. Shrink Missouri Government PAC,
the Court, in ascertaining what must be shown in order for political
contributions to be upheld, stated: “The quantum of empirical
evidence needed to satisfy heightened judicial scrutiny of legislative
judgments will vary up or down with the novelty and plausibility of
332
333
the justification raised.”
In Randall v. Sorrell, the Court again
underscored the important role of evidence to support state
interests when it rejected the contribution and expenditure limits
334
imposed by Vermont. In numerous cases the Supreme Court has
demanded that the compelling interest be real and not merely
335
conjecture, or at least some evidence be offered to support the
325. Common Cause/Ga. v. Billups, 504 F. Supp. 2d 1333, 1381 (N.D. Ga.
2007) (quoting Ind. Democratic Party v. Rokita, 458 F. Supp. 2d 775, 829 (S.D.
Ind. 2006)).
326. See also Constitutionality of 2005 PA 71, 740 N.W.2d at 456–57.
327. 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
328. Id. at 39–50.
329. Id. at 48–49.
330. Id. at 26–27.
331. 528 U.S. 377 (2000).
332. Id. at 378.
333. 126 S.Ct. 2479 (2006).
334. Id. at 2514.
335. See, e.g., Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 528 (2001); City of
Erie v. Pap’s A.M., 529 U.S. 277, 300 (2000); Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. F.C.C., 520
U.S. 180, 195 (1997); Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 514 U.S. 476, 496–97 (1995);
Florida Bar v. Went For It, Inc., 515 U.S. 618, 628 (1995); Edenfield v. Fane, 507
U.S. 761, 762 (1993).

http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol34/iss2/2

44

Schultz: Less Than Fundamental: The Myth of Voter Fraud and the Coming of
2. SCHULTZ - ADC.DOC.DOCM

2008]

1/31/2008 10:30:03 AM

THE MYTH OF VOTER FRAUD

527

336

interest.
Letting the government off the hook from having to
show the reality of the interest is simply an invitation for abuse of
rights.
Moreover, the evidence must be relevant and credible to
support the interest asserted. Judge Armijo in the New Mexico case
said the same. Recall also the district court judge in Rokita
dismissing the Brace Report as unreliable under the Federal Rule
337
of Evidence 702. The judge in Santillanes repeatedly stressed the
lack of admissible evidence supporting the governmental interest in
338
addressing fraud.
Judges need to apply Rule 702 and more fully
accept their role under Daubert standards when deciding to admit
339
evidence about fraud into court.
More specifically, as the first
part of the article demonstrated, much of the evidence of fraud is
not tied to voters, or the studies rely on conjecture or unproven
340
Thus, citations or references to Fund’s Stealing
assertions.
Elections or unproven assertions as found in the Carter-Baker
Report should be rendered inadmissible as failing Rule 702’s
Daubert standards. Finally, some types of evidence should not be
material to supporting photo ID requirements. For example, in
Rokita the judge cited to survey data as evidence that the public
341
supports the use of photo IDs for voting. Public opinion and fear
as justifying restrictions on fundamental rights are immaterial and
342
The entire
tantamount to a “heckler’s veto” on free speech.
purpose of the Bill of Rights is to check majority factions or the

336. See, e.g., FEC v. Wisconsin Right To Life, Inc., 127 S. Ct. 2652, 2692
(2007); First Nat’l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 788 (1978); Buckley v.
Valeo, 424 US. 1, 46 (1976) (discussing the role of evidence in supporting facial
versus applied challenges); see also Stephen E. Gottlieb, Compelling Governmental
Interests: An Essential But Unanalyzed Term in Constitutional Adjudication, 68 B.U. L.
REV. 917, 955–56 (1988) (discussing the importance of the governmental interest
being real).
337. See Ind. Democratic Party v. Rokita, 458 F. Supp. 2d 775, 803 (S.D. Ind.
2006).
338. See Women Voters of Albuquerque/Bernalillo County, Inc. v. Santillanes,
506 F.Supp.2d 598, 637 (D.N.M. 2007).
339. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993) (assigning
judges the role of determining the appropriateness of allowing scientific and
expert testimony into the record).
340. See infra Part II.B.
341. Rokita, 458 F. Supp. 2d at 794.
342. See Terminiello v. City of Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 4–5 (1949) (describing
early on the use of public anger to impact fundamental voting rights).
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tyranny of the majority from encroaching upon the rights of a
343
minority.
In addition, for the evidence to be real it needs to be
jurisdiction–specific. By that, one should not be able to support
the compelling interest of addressing fraud in one jurisdiction by
pointing to evidence in another. For example, in rejecting efforts
to limit campaign contributions, the court in Kruse v. City of
344
noted that the city had no experience with
Cincinnati
contribution limits at the local level at the time the spending limit
345
was passed.
As a result, the city had no evidence that
contribution limits were inadequate to prevent actual and
346
perceived quid pro quo corruption.
The city mistakenly relied
on the federal experience in national elections with contribution
limitations to support its contention that they will inevitably prove
347
As a result, the court voided the
inadequate at the local level.
348
contribution limits.
The Burdick test itself also appears to be flawed in several ways.
For example, there is an asymmetry in its application to evidence.
As the four cases upholding the ID laws demonstrate, plaintiffs
were required to document evidence of burden but defendants
were not required to do the same. At the very least, the same
standards of documentation should apply. Moreover, if the issue in
the case is whether the ID is a burden to a constitutionally
protected right, the presumption should initially be that the
343. W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 638 (1943). The Court
stated:
The very purpose of a Bill of Rights was to withdraw certain subjects from
the vicissitudes of political controversy, to place them beyond the reach
of majorities and officials and to establish them as legal principles to be
applied by the courts. One's right to life, liberty, and property, to free
speech, a free press, freedom of worship and assembly, and other
fundamental rights may not be submitted to vote; they depend on the
outcome of no elections.
Id. at 638. See also D. Bruce LaPierre, Campaign Contribution Limits: Pandering to
Public Fears About “Big Money” and Protecting Incumbents, 52 ADMIN. L. REV. 687, 694
(2000) (arguing how appeals to the fears of majorities is pandering and not an
appropriate measure to justify restrictions on free speech).
344. 142 F.3d 907 (6th Cir.1998).
345. Id. at 916.
346. Id. at 915–16.
347. Id. at 916.
348. See generally David Schultz, Proving Political Corruption: Documenting the
Evidence Required to Sustain Campaign Finance Reform Laws, 18 REV. LITIG. 85 (1999)
(arguing the necessity of making the evidence real and jurisdiction specific).
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government bears the burden to show why the regulation is not
severe, instead of requiring the plaintiff to show the severity.
Dissenting in Constitutionality of 2005 PA 71, Judge Cavanagh
349
found that 2005 PA 71 was unconstitutional.
In reaching that
conclusion, he argued that strict scrutiny was required because,
following Burdick, photo ID requirements impose a severe burden
350
on voting rights.
Judge Cavanagh supported this point first by
contending that because the photo ID requirement will deny some
citizens the right to vote, the presumption that the statute is
351
constitutional is not applicable. Second, Cavanagh noted that the
ID requirement will impose classifications upon those who exercise
voting rights, i.e., on the poor, elderly, disabled, and upon racial
and ethnic populations by subjecting them to different burdens
352
Given the presumption of unconstitutionality and
than others.
the differential treatment of some groups, 2005 PA 71 must be
353
subjected to strict scrutiny.
Moreover, according to Judge
Cavanagh, “[t]he government cannot now shield itself from strict
scrutiny because it provides only a purported rational basis for the
requirement while simultaneously failing to provide any evidence
354
In effect, Judge Cavanagh
to support its purported rationale.”
accuses the majority of engaging in circular logic: the state does not
need empirical evidence to support its interest in restricting voting
because strict scrutiny is not required to restrict the right to vote.
Judge Cavanagh effectively argues that an interest can only be
compelling if there is evidence to support it. Even if the interest
need not be compelling, but only rational, the “restriction, in this
case a photo identification requirement, must be reasonable given
355
the interest the restriction allegedly serves.”
Whatever the test, real
evidence is necessary to support an interest and the burden it

349. In re Request for Advisory Opinion Regarding Constitutionality of 2005
PA 71, 740 N.W.2d 444, 469 (Mich. 2007).
350. Id. at 463.
351. Id. at 472.
352. Id. at 473.
353. Id. at 493 (citing Harper v. Va. Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 670
(1966)). "[W]here fundamental rights and liberties are asserted under the Equal
Protection Clause, classifications which might invade or restrain them must be
closely scrutinized and carefully confined." Id.
354. Id. at 472.
355. Id. at 474.
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356

imposes upon voting.
Thus, lacking evidence, the restriction is
357
unconstitutional.
For numerous reasons, Judge Cavanagh’s comments are
significant. First, the test should require the government to detail
what constitutes a “severe” burden on a fundamental right. After
all, that is the normal requirement whenever the government seeks
358
to infringe upon these types of rights.
The Burdick test is also problematic in that it too never
explained what “severe” meant, apparently leaving it up to the
discretion of judges to ascertain its meaning. Indeed, there is a real
circularity and inconsistency to the test. Before one can decide
which level of analysis one has to use, the court must make a prior
determination about whether the burden is severe or not. If not,
then the flexible standard is used. Thus, if Burdick is supposed to
be a test, the outcome almost seems decided by a prior subjective
determination that the burden is not severe. Once that is
concluded, it is almost a foregone conclusion that a not-too-severe
burden will be classified as a legitimate regulation that will be
capable of upholding the ID requirement.
In Fullilove v.
359
Klutznick, Justice Marshall remarked of strict scrutiny that it is
360
“strict in theory, but fatal in fact.”
Under Burdick, if an ID
regulation is not severe in theory, it will not be found severe in fact.
The initial determination of burden appears to resolve the case.
Thus, the Burdick test, used this way, is superfluous to resolving the
controversy.
Courts must be more serious in weighing the government’s
interest against the burden on plaintiffs even if they plan to use the
Burdick flexible standard of review. If one pits an unproven or
unsubstantiated government interest against a demonstrated
burden, the weight assigned to the interest has to be nearly zero.
Still, the four courts using the Burdick flexible standard seem to
assume woodenly that if they have decided the burden is not
severe, then they will automatically uphold the regulation. This
does not appear to be what the Burdick Court intended. Plaintiffs
should thus assign the weights to the interests and burdens and be
356. Id. at 486.
357. Id.
358. See also Stephen E. Gottlieb, Compelling Governmental Interests: An Essential
But Unanalyzed Term in Constitutional Adjudication, 68 B.U. L. REV. 917, 955-56
(1988) (arguing the importance of the requirement to protect democracy).
359. 448 U.S. 448 (1980) (Marshall, J., concurring).
360. Id. at 519.
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prepared to present both the severe and not–so–severe burden
arguments.
Finally, the four courts thus far upholding voter ID laws have
simply gotten it wrong when applying the Burdick test. They seem
to be applying the test like a light switch in either finding the
burden to be severe and therefore requiring strict scrutiny, or not
finding the burden to be severe and therefore using what appears
to be something more closely resembling rational basis. In effect,
they have misread Burdick as overturning past precedent that found
voting to be a fundamental right. Judge Cavanagh was correct in
361
The test does not push an examination
pointing out this error.
of the burdens on voting rights to rational basis if the burdens are
362
determined not to be severe. Instead, the Indiana court correctly
determined that some form of intermediate scrutiny is
363
demanded.
VI. CONCLUSION
The purpose of this article has been to document the illusory
nature of the evidence purporting voter fraud and to show
plaintiffs how best to defend against attacks on the right to vote: by
challenging the evidence, the application of the Burdick test, and
even the test itself.
The battle over voter photo identification is a battle for
democracy
against
a
second
great
wave
of
voter
disenfranchisement. Like the first wave at the end of the
Nineteenth and beginning of the Twentieth Centuries, which
augmented the fear of voter fraud as a way to disenfranchise
African-Americans, ex-felons, urban poor, and ethnic populations,
the new disenfranchisement uses similar fears to accomplish the
same today. The case for voter fraud—individuals impersonating
others at the polls—is largely built on hype and the type of hearsay
that should not be permitted in court for the purposes of denying
361. Constitutionality of 2005 PA 71, 740 N.W.2d 444, 489 (Cavanaugh, J.,
dissenting).
362. See Jacqueline Ricciani, Burdick v. Takushi: the Anderson Balancing Test to
Sustain Prohibitions on Write-in Voting, 13 PACE L. REV. 949 (1994) (examining the
Burdick test and concluding that its adoption of the ballot access cases indicate that
some form of intermediate level of scrutiny is required when the burdens on
voting rights are found to be less than severe).
363. See also Crawford v. Marion County Election Bd., 472 F.3d 949, 954, 956
(7th Cir. 2007) (contending that Burdick’s lesser level of scrutiny calls for at least
“strict scrutiny light”) (Evans, J., dissenting).
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individuals the right to vote. Unfortunately, in four cases so far, the
courts have been unwilling to police the evidence, take seriously
the fundamental nature of voting rights, and protect franchise
rights.
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